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COMMENT 
PROTECTING THE CHILD'S BEST 
INTEREST: 
DEFENDING SECOND-PARENT 
ADOPTIONS GRANTED PRIOR TO 
THE 2002 ENACTMENT OF 
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 25 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a child with two parents. Imagine a child who, 
from birth, looked to these two people for support, food, shelter, 
clothing, and love. This child knows that these two people are 
her parents. Should something go wrong, this child will turn to 
these two people for help. Yet, only one of the child's parents is 
her legal parent. This child has two parents of the same-sex. 
One of her mothers was artificially inseminated. The child's 
other mother was there every step of the way helping the 
biological parent. In every sense of the word, the nonbiological 
mother is the child's parent. Yet, courts and legislatures do not 
always recognize this relationship. This child's parent does not 
fit neatly into the legal definition of a parent. Even though a 
child has two parents, only one of them is the legal parent. 
Imagine the child has started school. The teacher has 
planned a field trip to the zoo. The teacher passes out 
permission slips for the parents to sign. The permission slip 
needs to be signed by the child's legal guardian or parent. The 
child's biological parent is on a business trip and will not be 
home in time to sign the permission slip. The nonbiological 
parent is not the child's legal guardian. While the teacher will 
accept the nonbiological parent's consent on the permission 
slip, in other instances, the nonbiological parent's consent is 
not enough. This one issue regarding the child's field trip is 
173 
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trivial compared to the actual legal issues facing children of 
same-sex parents. 
Imagine that the child is playing in the schoolyard during 
the school day. The child suffers a serious injury and needs to 
go to the hospital. The hospital contacts the nonbiological 
mother and she meets her child at the hospital. She talks to 
the doctor, the doctor informs her that the child is in need of a 
medical procedure, and legal consent is required. The child's 
legal mother is not in town. The child's nonbiological mother 
cannot give consent. Only one parent is the child's legal 
parent. Only one parent can consent to life-saving medical 
procedures or portray herself as the child's legal parent. 
One method in which courts have recognized the 
relationship between children and their nonbiological parent is 
through second-parent adoptions. Much like stepparent 
adoptions, second-parent adoptions allow the child's 
nonbiological parent to become the child's legal parent. Courts 
grant the adoption without severing the parental rights of the 
biological parent. This concept of second-parent adoptions first 
surfaced in the 1980s.1 Second-parent adoptions have allowed 
many children the benefit of having two, legally recognizable 
parents. Yet, in California, the legal relationship between 
children in same-sex, second-parent relationships and their 
non-biological parent are in jeopardy. 
A ruling by the California Court of Appeal threatens the 
validity of these second-parent adoptions. Sharon S. u. 
Superior Court 2 is pending review before the California 
Supreme Court. This case may nullify second-parent adoptions 
granted in California prior to the enactment of Assembly Bill 
25, which gave same-sex domestic partners the statutory right 
to adopt their partner's children.3 Section I will examine the 
factual history and majority and minority opinions in Sharon 
S. Next, Section II of this comment will survey the history of 
1 The National Center for Lesbian Rights, Second·Parent Adoptions: An 
Information Sheet, available at 
http://www.nclrights.org/publicatons/2ndparentadoptions.htm (last updated September 
2002). Id. The National Center for Lesbian Rights originated the idea of second· 
parent adoptions. Id. 
2 Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. App. 2001) rev. granted 
39 P.3d 512 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2002). 
3 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002); A.B. 25, 2000·2001 
regular session (CaL). 
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adoption law and California Assembly Bill 25. Finally, Section 
III of this comment will consider differing state court opinions 
regarding second-parent adoptions. Section III will also offer 
remedies to counteract potential nullification of second-parent 
adoptions granted in California before January 1, 2002. 
I. SHARON S. V. SUPERIOR COURT STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sharon S. u. Superior Court concerns two women, Sharon 
S. and Annette F. Annette and Sharon while attending college 
and began a lesbian relationship.4 The two moved to San Diego 
in 1990.5 Annette and Sharon expressed their commitment to 
each other through a commitment ceremony in 1992.6 The two 
also entered a "living together agreement" in 1992.7 
When the couple first decided to have children, Sharon and 
Annette chose an anonymous sperm donor and Sharon was 
artificially inseminated.s On October 15, 1996, Sharon gave 
birth to Zachary S.9 Annette and Sharon began adoption 
proceedings shortly after Zachary's birth and the court granted 
Annette's adoption petition. lO The San Diego Superior Court 
allowed Annette to adopt Zachary without terminating 
Sharon's parental rights.! 1 In 1998, Sharon was again 
artificially inseminated with the same anonymous donor and 
4 Petitioner Sharon S.'s Answer Brief on the Merits at 2·9, Sharon S. v. Superior 
Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. App. 2001) rev. granted 39 P.3d 512 (Cal. Jan. 29, 
2002) (No. S102671) [hereinafter Sharon's Brief]. (Pagination to the brief is not 
available. The brief can be found on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1926003. Citations to this 
brief will refer the reader to the page range available in the brief and the Westlaw page 
number.) 
5 Id. and 2002 WL 1926003, at *7. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. A living together agreement acts like a prenuptial agreement for homosexual 
couples that make a commitment to live their lives together. Rainbow Law, Living 
Together Agreement, (2002), available at 
http://www.rainbowlaw.com/htmls/together.html.Aliving together agreement sets 
forth the property of each party to the agreement and provides for resolution of 
disputes that may arise should the relationship end. Id. 
S Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. 
9 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7. 
10 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. 
II Real Party in Interest Annette F.'s Opening Brief on the Merits at 4-7, Sharon S. 
v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. 2001) rev. granted 39 P.3d 512 (Jan. 29, 
2002) (No. S102671), [hereinafter Annette's Brief]. (pagination to the brief is not 
available. The brief can be found on Westlaw at 2002 WL 985011. Citations to thi/l 
brief will refer the reader to the page range in the brief and the Westlaw page number.) 
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Sharon gave birth on June 18, 1999 to Joshua S,12 In July 
1999, Annette and Sharon met with an attorney so that 
Annette could petition the court to adopt Joshua.13 
As with Zachary's adoption, Annette sought to adopt under 
the Independent Adoption Act codified in Sections 8800 
through 8823 of the California Family Code,14 When Sharon 
and Annette initiated proceedings for Annette to adopt 
Zachary, neither wanted Sharon's parental rights terminated.!5 
Section 8617 of the California Family Code, however, requires 
the court to terminate Sharon's parental rights. 16 To prevent 
termination of her parental rights, Sharon filed an addendum 
to the adoption agreement expressly stating that she did not 
intend to terminate her parental rights.!7 Sharon intended to 
retain her parental rights while concurrently conferring 
parental rights to Annette. 1S Prior to granting the adoption, 
the San Diego Department of Health and Human Services 
submitted a report recommending that the superior court allow 
Annette to adopt Joshua, finding that the adoption was in 
Joshua's best interest.!9 In July 2000, incidences of violence 
erupted between the couple20 and shortly thereafter, Sharon 
requested that the court take the proposed adoption proceeding 
off calendar,21 
A. THE SUPERIOR COURT GRANTED ANNETTE'S ADOPTION 
PETITION BUT THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED 
After Sharon requested the court take the adoption 
proceedings off calendar, Annette filed an Order to Show Cause 
seeking sole physical custody of Zachary and Joshua and filed a 
Petition to Establish Parental Relationship on September 22, 
12 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7; Sharon S., 113 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. 
13 Id. Sharon S. acknowledged she signed the fee agreement with Annette July 27, 
1999 but stated she never actually met the attorney until July 14, 2000. Id. 
14 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110, 112. 
15 Id. at 110. 
16 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 1994). 
17 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. 
18 Annette's Brief, supra note 11, at 4-7 and 2002 WL 985011, at * 8. 
19 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 9. 
20 Id. Sharon alleged that Annette had hit her. Id. This caused Sharon to seek a 
temporary restraining order from the court. Id. It was granted. Id. 
21 Id. 
4
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2000.22 Then on October 23, 2000, Annette moved to adopt 
Joshua.23 Annette argued that the adoption was in Joshua's 
best interest. She further called to the court's attention that 
Sharon had not withdrawn her consent to Joshua's adoption. 
Sharon did not withdraw her consent despite the fact that she 
sought to take the adoption proceedings off calendar. Annette 
argued that due to the doctrine of parenthood by estoppel, she 
could petition to adopt Joshua.24 Although Sharon and Annette 
temporarily agreed to a custody plan, they failed to agree on a 
final plan during mediation on November 2, 2000.25 On 
November 8, 2000, Sharon filed a motion to withdraw her 
consent to the independent adoption.26 On that same day, the 
Department of Health and Human Services filed a 
supplemental report reaffirming their finding that the adoption 
was in Joshua's best interest.27 
Notwithstanding the Department's recommendation, 
Sharon filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition on 
December 11, 2000.28 Sharon argued that she did not consent 
to the adoption, therefore the court could not grant Annette's 
petition.29 Since Sharon did not fully withdraw her consent, 
the statutory requirements of the Independent Adoption Act 
had not been met. 30 Therefore, the altered agreement was not 
legally enforceable.31 Sharon also mentioned, but did not fully 
discuss that superior courts did not have the jurisdiction to 
grant second-parent adoptions.32 
On March 19, 2001, the San Diego County Superior Court 
granted the adoption.33 Sharon appealed the decision.34 On 
October 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial court's 






27 Id. at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *9·10. 
28 Id. at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10 
29 Id. 
30 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. 
31 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10. 
32 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. 
33 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10. 
34 Id. at 107. 
35 See id. at 115·116. 
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appellate court denied the adoption because it found that the 
California legislature had not previously prescribed second-
parent adoptions in the adoption statutes.36 
B. THE MAJORITY STRICTLY CONSTRUED THE ADOPTION 
STATUTE THEREBY DENYING ANNETTE'S PETITION FOR 
ADOPTION 
In reviewing the petition for adoption, the majority 
examined the three types of adoptions available in California-
agency adoption, independent adoption and stepparent 
adoption. In an agency adoption, the birth parents relinquish 
their parental rights to a licensed adoption agency or social 
services.37 The agency then has exclusive control to oversee the 
child's adoption.38 In an independent adoption, the birth 
parents relinquish their parental rights directly to the adoptive 
parent.39 In a stepparent adoption, the spouse of the 
birthparent petitions to adopt the birth parent's child without 
terminating the birthparent's parental rights.40 
The appellate court decided whether a second-parent 
adoption could properly proceed as an independent adoption.41 
The court answered in the negative.42 Although Annette 
argued that the adoption statutes should be liberally construed 
to promote the best interest of the child, the appellate court 
refused to do so, thus preventing Annette from adopting 
Joshua.43 Annette relied heavily on Marshall u. Marshall,44 a 
1925 California Supreme Court case that discussed stepparent 
adoptions. In Marshall, the California Supreme Court liberally 
construed the adoption statutes so that the natural mother's 
parental rights were not terminated when the stepfather 
adopted the children.45 Even though stepparent adoptions did 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 111. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 112. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 114. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 112, 115-116. 
44 Marshall v. Marshall, 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925). 
45 See generally id. In Marshall, the natural mother permitted the stepfather to 
adopt the children. Id. at 237. In the adoption, the stepfather adopted the children 
which caused the mother to lose her parental rights. Id. at 237. The stepfather then 
6
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not then exist by statute, the California Supreme Court paved 
the way for future legislation.46 After Marshall, the California 
legislature not only amended the independent adoption statute 
but also created a new classification-stepparent adoptions.47 
The Sharon S. majority regarded the Marshall decision as 
dicta and not as precedent for the court to follow. 48 The 
majority reasoned that application of Marshall would 
undermine the express statutory language that for a person to 
adopt a child in an independent or agency adoption, the natural 
parent's rights must be terminated.49 Furthermore, courts 
were not required to question legislative intent, but rather 
apply the unambiguous language of the statute, which requires 
termination of parental rights. 50 Based on the strict 
application and construction of the Family Code, the majority 
dismissed the adoption petition. 51 
C. THE DISSENTING JUDGE IN SHARON S. SAW THAT GRANTING 
THE ADOPTION WAS IN JOSHUA'S BEST INTEREST 
Presiding Judge Kremer stated that he would have 
granted Annette's adoption petition since he found Marshall 
decision to be controlling. 52 Judge Kremer disagreed with the 
dismissal of the adoption petition since Annette and Sharon 
obviously intended the adoption to occur. 53 He argued that 
dismissal of the petition affected a result so plainly opposite to 
the parties' original intent. 54 According to the dissent, the 
Marshall court effectively read a stepparent adoption into the 
attempted to clear himself of child support obligations after his divorce from the 
natural mother by allowing the mother to readopt the children. Id. at 237. The 
California Supreme Court liberally construed the then existing adoption statutes by 
saying that it was preposterous that the mother's parental rights would be terminated 
solely because the stepfather had adopted the children. Id. at 237-238. 
46 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118 (2001) (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 113. 
49 Id. at 114. 
60 Id. (discussing California Teacher Ass'n. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified 
School Dist., 927 P.2d 1175 (Cal. 1997». 
51 Id. at 115. 
52 Id. at 116 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 118 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 
813 P.2d 240,245 n.7 (1991». 
64 Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 767). 
7
Lauretta: Defending Second-Parent Adoptions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003
180 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
statute. 55 Based on the precedent from Marshall, the Sharon 
S. dissent examined the existing independent adoption 
statute.56 Through his examination, Judge Kremer liberally 
construed the adoption statute to allow a second-parent 
adoption to occur.57 
Analogizing Marshall to Annette and Sharon's situation, 
the dissent found that second-parent adoptions petitioned 
through the independent adoption act are a legitimate 
procedure. 58 Using the guidance of Marshall, the court 
recognized the necessity to liberally construe adoption statutes 
to effectuate decisions to protect the child's welfare.59 The 
guidance of Marshall and the remedies discussed in Section of 
this comment, allow the California Supreme Court to preserve 
those second-parent adoptions granted prior to the enactment 
of California Assembly Bill 25.60 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE STATE, NOT THE COMMON LAw, CREATED ADOPTION 
LAw 
An adoption recognizes a nonbiological parent as the legal 
parent of the child. "Adoption, properly considered, refers to 
persons who are strangers in blood."61 The relationship 
formed out of an adoption "implies that the natural 
relationship between the child and its parents by blood is 
superceded."62 Adoption law was not known at common law, 
but it was known in Roman law.63 Since the first adoption 
statute enacted by Massachusetts in 1851, state legislatures 
have established adoption laws in the United States.64 
55 Id. at 118 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
56 Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 117 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
58 Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 117 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Dept. of Social Welfare v. Superior 
Court., 459 P.2d 897, 899 (1969». 
60 A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.). California Assembly Bill 25 is 
discussed in Part C of this Section. 
6! Blythe v. Ayres, 31 P. 915, 916 (Cal. 1892) (action by illegitimate child through 
her mother to determine heirship and title to father's estate). 
62 Estate of Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 366 (2001) (quoting Estate of Jobson, 128 P. 
938 (1912». 
63 Id. at 365. 
64 Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State Court 
8
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Therefore, "[t]he right of adoption is wholly statutory."65 
Historically, when interpreting adoption statutes, judges defer 
to the plain language of the statute.66 The judicial common law 
approaches adoption laws with hostility because the state 
invented the concept of adoption law.67 
Adoption law progresses with societal development and 
shifts to reflect the changing societal definition of a family.68 In 
the United States in 1998, there were 1,674,000 same-sex 
partnerships.69 Of these partnerships, 167,000 couples were 
raising children.70 Thus, the traditional nuclear family71 is no 
longer the only one that exists in today's society. More 
recently, an increase in nontraditional families has lead to 
heightened acceptance of gay and lesbian families. 72 Today, 
only one-fourth of families fit the concept of a traditional 
nuclear family.73 
Today, stepparents file the majority of adoption petitions.74 
In a stepparent adoption, after the court terminates one 
natural parent's parental rights, the stepparent becomes the 
legally recognized parent of his or her spouse's child.75 In a 
stepparent adoption, one biological parent remains the legal 
parent of the child.76 Adoptions also occur through agency and 
independent adoptions. These adoptions contrast stepparent 
adoptions in one important way. Whereas one parent retains 
his or her parental rights to the child in stepparent adoptions, 
Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1499 (1998). Massachusetts was the first state 
to enact an adoption statute. Id. at 1499. 
65 In re Brandel's Estate, 112 P.2d 976, 977 (Cal. 1941). 
66 See In re Sharon's Estate, 177 P. 283, 286 (Cal. 1918) (courts originally strictly 
construed adoption statute). See also In re Crutcher, 215 P. 101, 102 (Cal 1923}. 
67 Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. Starr, supra note 64, at 1499. 
68 See Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally 
Recognizing the Relationship between the Non-Biological Lesbian Parent and her Child, 
43 HAsTINGS L. REV. 177 (1991). 
69 Kitty Mak, California's New Domestic Partnership Registration Act may Aid 
Same-Sex Partners in Providing a Legal Basis for Their Life Relationship, L.A. 
LAWYER, July/Aug. 2001, at 35. 
70 See id. at 35. 
71 By traditional nuclear family, this author is referring to families consisting of a 
married father and mother and their children. 
72 Starr, supra note 64, at 1513. 
73 Id. 
74 National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, State Laws Regarding Adoption 
by Gay and Lesbian Parents: Second Parent Adoptions (Nov. 13, 2002) available at 
http://www.calib.comlnaiclpubsll_same.cfm. 
75 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. 
76 Id. 
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in independent and agency adoptions, the natural parent's 
parental rights are terminated.77 Within' these adoption 
frameworks, same-sex second-parents are left with little 
statutory ability to become the adoptive parent of their 
partner's child. 
B. CHANGING FAMILIES HAVE PROMPTED CHANGING 
ADOPTION LAws 
As society has become increasingly accepting of alternative 
and diverse lifestyles, courts have increased legal rights to 
these newly emerging families. 78 Specifically, courts are more 
often likely to grant second-parent adoptions, rather than 
denying the adoptions because they do not fit into the statutory 
scheme of adoptions. Courts permit second-parent adoptions 
because they recognize that an adoption provides many 
benefits to the family. It bestows legal protections to the 
parents and child. 79 The adoption also benefits the child 
psychologically. 80 The adoption gives the child security in 
knowing it has two legally recognizable parents. Lastly, some 
courts recognize that the adoption promotes the best interests 
of the child.81 
The best interest of the child standard originated from 
custody proceedings82 and is intended to "maximize a child's 
opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult."83 
Courts originally regarded children as property of the father 
and automatically granted the father custody rights.84 Once 
courts recognized the rights of the mother, they shifted their 
focus to the "tender years" presumption. With the "tender 
years" presumption, when parents divorced, courts would 
77 Id. at 111. 
78 Delaney, supra nqte 68 , at 206-207. 
79 Id. at 179. 
80 Id. 
8! Id. at 215. 
82 Sheryl C. Sultan, Note and Comment, The Right of Homosexuals to Adopt: 
Changing Legal Interpretations of ''Parent'' and ''Family,'' 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L 45, 
59 (1995). 
83 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (two siblings were placed 
in foster care and were placed with two different families and one family contested 
other adoption because need for siblings to remain together court found that it was in 
child's best interest to continue placement with two separate families); Adoption of 
Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (1975). 
84 Sultan, supra note 82, at 59. 
10
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presumptively grant custody to the mother if the child was of 
tender years.85 Adoption law progressed again from 
automatically granting custody of a child of tender years to the 
mother, to instead facilitating the best interest of the child. 86 
To facilitate the best interest of the child, courts review all 
relevant information available.87 Courts consider the following 
factors: the child's desires, the child's present and future need 
for emotional and physical support, parental abilities and the 
stability of the home.88 These factors, however, cannot be 
"ascertained by crude calculation."89 By crude calculation, the 
court recognized that a rigid set of criteria for prospective 
parents to fulfill would not further determination of the best 
interests of the child.90 Instead, courts should review adoption 
petitions on a case-by-case basis.91 
When granting same-sex second-parent adoptions, courts 
look to the participation of the partner in the child's life as well 
as a bond between the child and partner.92 Courts regard the 
best interests of the child as paramount when granting 
adoptions.93 Children benefit both financially and emotionally 
by having two, legally recognized parents. When granting 
second-parent adoptions, a majority of states and courts view 
this benefit to be in the child's welfare.94 For example, 
California courts initially considered homosexual conduct as a 
factor in determining the best interest of the child.95 The 
85 See Browne v. Browne, 141 P.2d 428,429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943); Loomis v. Loomis, 
201 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Wilson v. Wilson, 13 P.2d 376, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1932). "As is said in Russell v. Russell, 129 P. 467, 468, 'There cannot be any fIxed and 
certain age of minority which, in all cases and for all purposes, can be said to constitute 
a child of "tender years'" (See also Ludlow v. Ludlow, 89 Cal. App. 2d 610, 616, 201 
P.2d 579)." Denham v. Martina, 29 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1963). 
86 Sultan, supra note 82, at 59; Wilson v. Wilson, 13 P.2d at 378. 
87 In re Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1375, 1380-1381 (pa. Super. 1989) (evidence 
from grandparents, along with adoption agency's fIndings, was needed to make a 
decision in the best interest of the child). 
88 McGuire v. Brown, 580 S.W.2d 425,429 (Tex. App. 1979). 
89 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3. See also Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 
3d 699, 704. "The best interest of the child is an elusive guideline that belies rigid 
defInition." Id. 
90 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3 
91 Id. 
92 In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535,539 (N.J. Super. 1995). 
93 In re Adoption of Bird, 6 Cal. Rptr. 675, 679 (1960) (citing In re Hickson, 40 Cal. 
App. 2d 89, 92). 
94 Starr, supra note 64, at 1499. 
95 Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1975). "In exercising a choice between 
homosexual and heterosexual households for purposes of child custody a trial court 
11
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courts in California, however, no longer follow this standard.96 
Conversely, Florida prohibits homosexuals from adopting.97 
Utah prohibits cohabitating, non-married couples from 
adopting children. 98 Yet, aNew Jersey court acknowledged 
that no inherent difference exists between homosexual parents 
and heterosexual parents, thereby refusing to tacitly support 
the unfounded stereotypes held by people against same sex 
parents.99 
In Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G.,lOO the New 
Jersey superior court granted a same-sex, second-parent 
adoption petition by a non-biological mother.101 In granting the 
adoption, the court first looked to the concerns voiced by other 
could conclude that permanent residence in a homosexual household would be 
detrimental to the children and contrary to their best interests." Id at 26. 
96 In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1988) (In custody dispute after 
parents' divorce, mother attempted to bar father from having overnight visits because 
father was a homosexual. Id. at 288. The court vacated the order of the trial court 
that prevented the father from the child being in the presence of any homosexual friend 
or acquaintance of the father. Id. at 291. The fact that the father is homosexual does 
not automatically create a presumption that father is unfit to care for his child. Id. at 
289. 
97 Debra Caraaquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same·Sex Partners, 
Their Children, and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C.L. REV. 883, 894. See FL ST § 
63.042(3): "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a 
homosexual." Id. 
98 Hedges, supra note 97, at 896. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78·30·9 (2001): "(3)(a) The 
Legislature specifically finds that it is not in a child's best interest to be adopted by a 
person or persons who are cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and 
binding marriage under the laws of this state. Nothing in this section limits or 
prohibits the court's placement of a child with a single adult who is not cohabiting as 
defined in Subsection (3)(b); (3)(b) For purposes of this section, 'cohabiting' means 
residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that 
person." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78·30·9 .. The Utah State Legislature added the provision 
prohibiting non· marital couples to adopt children in March 2000. Hedges, supra note 
97, at 896. The Utah legislature added this provision soon after New Hampshire lifted 
its ban on adoptions by homosexuals. Id. While the Utah statutes does not expressly 
prohibit same· sex couples from adoption, since same· sex couples do not have the option 
to marry, this code does prevent them from adopting children if they lived together in a 
committed relationship. Id. While the Utah statute this statute does not expressly 
prohibit same· sex couples to adopt, the state legislature only recently added in the 
provision about non·marital, cohabitating couples from adoption in March 2000, soon 
after New Hampshire repealed its statute prohibiting homosexuals from adoption. Id. 
While nonmarital, cohabitating couples include both heterosexual and homosexual 
couples, homosexual couples do not have the opportunity to marry legally and therefore 
are disparately impacted by Utah's legislation. See id. at 901·902. 
99 Sonja J. Larsen, J.D., Adoption of Child by Same·Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R. 5th 54, 
65 (1995) (discussing Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J. 
Super. 1993». 
100 Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 
101 Id. at 555. 
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courts that the children of same-sex partnerships would face 
harassment from the children's peers.102 The court refused to 
bolster the notion that denying the adoption petition would 
save the child from this perceived harassment. 103 The evidence 
before the court demonstrated that the adoption would promote 
the best interest of the child, regardless of the parents' sexual 
orientation. 104 The court implied that children in homosexual 
households do not differ from children in heterosexual 
households. 105 
The American Academy of Pediatrics unequivocally 
supported the holding of the New Jersey court when it 
announced its landmark policy towards gay and lesbian 
parents in February 2002.106 The American Academy of 
Pediatrics stated that gay and lesbian parents possess the 
desire to have and raise children just as heterosexual parents 
possess the desire to have and raise children.l°7 In fact, 
children of gay and lesbian parents have some advantages over 
children of heterosexual parents, namely that children of same-
sex parents tolerate diversity more than children of 
heterosexual parents do.108 Further, "[d]enying legal parent 
status through adoption to coparents or second-parents 
prevents these children from enjoying the psychologic and legal 
security that comes from having two willing, capable, and 
loving parents."109 
102 Id. at 552. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 554. 
105 Id. 
106 See Committee on Psychosocial Aspect of Child and Family Health, Coparent or 
Second-parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 Am. Acad, of Pediatrics, Feb. 2002 
at 339 [hereinafter Child and Family Health Comm.] available at 
http://www.aap.org/policy/020008.html.SeealsoEllenC.Perrin.MD. et aI, Technical 
Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics, Feb. 2002, at 341 [hereinafter Perrin] available at 
http://www.aap.org/policy/020008t.html. 
107 Perrin, supra note 106, at 341-344. 
108 Id. Besides being more tolerant to diversity, children of gay and lesbian parents 
are also found to be more nurturing of younger children, more affectionate, and 
responsive whereas children of heterosexual children were seen as domineering, bossy 
and negative. Id. Children of gay and lesbian parents had higher self esteem and were 
more open to the possibility of having a same-sex partner, yet the proportion of gay and 
lesbian children raised by gay and lesbian parents were the same proportions of gay 
and lesbian children raised by heterosexual parents. Id. 
109 Child and Family Health Comm., supra note 106, at 339-340. 
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With the sharp rise in nontraditional families and their 
increased acceptance, families have turned to the courts to 
obtain legal protection and rights. Slowly adoption law has 
evolved to meet the changing shape offamilies. llo Not only has 
homosexuality been removed in many states as a bar to 
adoption, but also courts and legislatures consider homosexual 
parents equally capable as heterosexual parents in having and 
raising well-adjusted children. The increased acceptance has 
led states, like California, to pass legislation that recogmzes 
the right of nonbiological parents to adopt. 
C. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 25 LEGALLY RECOGNIZES 
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS GRANTED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2002. 
The California legislature furthered the evolution of 
adoption law by enacting California Assembly Bill 25 for the 
regular 2000-2001 session.l ll California Assembly Bill 25 is a 
collection of changes to existing state law that conferred a 
number of rights on registered domestic partners.1l2 California 
recognized domestic partnerships in 1999 with the enactment 
of Section 297 of the Family Code.113 California now legally 
recognizes domestic partners in part due to the increase in and 
acceptance of, cohabitating, nonmarital couples. 1l4 Thus, a 
110 See generally Delaney, supra note 68. 
111 See A.B. 25, 2000·2001 regular session (Cal.). 
112 When Governor Gray Davis signed this piece of legislation, he issued the 
following statement: "To the Members of the California Legislature: I am signing 
Assembly Bill 25 which would enable domestic partners to make medical decisions for 
incapacitated loved ones, adopt their partner's child, use sick leave to care for their 
partner, recover damages for wrongful death, and allow the right to be named a 
conservator of a will. In California, a legal marriage is between a man and a woman. I 
believe the only things that can undermine the bonds of a strong marriage are 
ignorance and fear. This legislation does nothing to contradict or undermine the 
definition of a legal marriage, nor is it about special rights. It is about civil rights, 
respect, responsibility, and, most of all, it is about family. Therefore, I am honored to 
sign one of the strongest domestic partner laws in the nation. Sincerely, GRAY 
DAVIS." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West Supp. 2002). This author will not comment 
on the political reasons Governor Davis signed Assembly Bill 25, but this statement 
sees the need to recognize all families, not just the traditional family with two 
heterosexual parents. 
113 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2002). When examining Section 297, it would 
seem to this author the main purpose of this statute would be to allow two mutual 
caring adults to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship. 
114 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Article, The Regulation of Nonmarital Cohabitants: 
Rights and Responsibilities of the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1265, 1296 (2001). 
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domestic partnership is a new legal status that contains some 
of the legal rights of marriage and yet, it still falls short of its 
definition,115 most importantly a marriage can only occur 
between a man and a woman.116 
One of the rights gained by same-sex domestic partners 
through the Assembly Bill 25's amendment to Section 9000 of 
the California Family Code is the right for a registered 
domestic partner to adopt the child of his or her registered 
domestic partner without terminating the rights of the 
biological parent,l17 In essence, the statute allows same-sex 
domestic partners to seek stepparent adoptions. Prior to the 
changes to Section 9000 of the California Family Code, courts 
granted same-sex, second-parent adoptions under a number of 
doctrines, including in loco parentis,118 de facto parenthood,119 
and intended parentage. 120 Courts relied on these doctrines 
because they lacked the statutory ability to grant second-
parent adoptions to same-sex couples. In loco parentis, de facto 
parenthood and intended parentage contributed to the 
evolution of adoption law and the enactment of California 
Assembly Bill 25. 
"A California appellate court has described the concept of 
in loco parentis in the following terms: 
[A] person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful 
parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental 
relationship, without going through the formalities necessary 
to legal adoption, ... stand[s] in loco parentis, and the rights, 
duties and liabilities of such person are the same as those of 
the lawful parent." 
115 Id. at 1272. 
116 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5. (West Supp. 2000). This comment will not explore the 
similarities and differences in heterosexual marriages and domestic partners except for 
the ability to adopt under Section 9000 of the California Family Code. 
ll7 Note the parallelism in subparts (a) and (b) of Section 9000 of the Family Code: 
(a) A stepparent desiring to adopt a child of the stepparent's spouse may for that 
purpose file a petition in the county in which the petitioner resides. (b) A domestic 
partner, as defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her domestic 
partner may for that purpose file a petition in the county in which the petitioner 
resides. In substituting the language for stepparent with domestic partner, the 
California legislature has legally recognized second-parent adoptions by same-sex 
partners. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000. 
118 See Delaney, supra note 68, at 187-188. 
119 Id. at 188. 
120 Mak, supra note 69, at 40. 
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A court first applied the common law doctrine of in loco 
parentis to a same-sex, second-parent adoption in 1991.121 
Courts most often apply this doctrine in stepparent 
adoptions.122 In loco parentis adoptions provide a viable option 
for same-sex parents because this doctrine allows the second-
parent to become a legal parent without divesting the biological 
parent of his or her rights. 123 
A de facto parent is one who assumes the role of a 
parent. 124 Courts also consider de facto parents as 
psychological parents.125 "A psychological parent fulfills not 
only the child's physical needs, but also the child's 
psychological needs through continuing interaction, 
companionship, interplay and emotional mutuality on a day to 
day basis."126 Same-sex couples seeking to adopt under the de 
facto parenthood doctrine, however, have recognized the 
ineffectiveness of this doctrine.127 De facto parenthood fails to 
give nonbiological parents equal rights with the biological 
parent.12B De facto parents do not receive legal rights over the 
child.129 
The doctrine of intended parentage bestows legal rights on 
the gay or lesbian partner of the biological parent in two 
ways.130 First, if the nonbiological partner jointly decides with 
the biological parent to conceive a child through artificial 
insemination, the nonbiological parent can obtain a pre-birth 
declaration of parentage from the court.131 Second, if the 
nonbiological parent assists the biological parent in finding a 
surrogate mother to conceive their child, the nonbiological 
121 Id. at 195; Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991) (Nancy S. arose out 
of a custody dispute involving two lesbian parents who decided to have one of the 
women become artificially inseminated. Id. at 213. "[I[n loco parentis has been used to 
impose the same rights and obligations imposed by statutory and common law upon 
parents." Id. at 217. The court was unwilling to extend this doctrine to the 
nonbiological mother in this case. Id. at 219.) 
122 Delaney, supra note 68, at 194. 
123 Id. 
124 Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217. 
125 Delaney, supra note 68, at 202; In re B.G., 523 P. 2d 224 (Cal. 1974). 
126 Vanessa L. Warznski, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The 
"Psychological Parent" Standard, 39 VILL. L. REV. 737, 748 (1994). 
127 Delaney. supra note 68, at 19l. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 190. 
130 Mak, supra note 69, at 40. 
131 Id. 
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parent can obtain a pre-birth declaration of parentage from the 
court. 132 In both of these methods, the nonbiological and 
biological parents participate in raising the child and provide 
the child with emotional and financial support. 
Same-sex parents, however, no longer rely on these 
methods. When the California legislature allowed for same-
sex, domestic partners to register with the state, the author of 
that bill noted that the amendments were "designed to 
strengthen, protect, and promote committed family 
relationships." 133 Allowing same-sex couples to adopt each 
other's child legally protects the family relationship and 
extends the idea to promote committed family relationships. 
The California legislature indicated they passed Assembly Bill 
25, in part, because same-sex couples and their children needed 
proper legal protections. 134 
California adoption law has evolved with the statutory 
ability for registered domestic partners to legally adopt their 
partner's children.135 Same-sex couples no longer need the 
doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parenthood, and intended 
parentage because Section 9000 of the California Family Code 
allows second -parent adoptions by registered domestic 
partners. California public policy recognizes that the parent-
child relationship consists of the conduct of the parent and the 
bond between parent and child rather than the blood 
relationship. 136 The only problem remaining is the validity of 
second-parent adoptions granted before enactment of Assembly 
25 challenged by the decision in Sharon S. v. Superior Court. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. GRANTING SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ABSENT EXPRESS 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
Trial courts in California have granted approximately 
10,000 to 20,000 second-parent adoptions over the past fifteen 
132 Id. 
133 Committee Report for 1999 California Senate Bill No. 75, 1999·2000 regular 
session (Aug. 30, 1999) [hereinafter SB 75 Comm. Report]. 
134 Committee Report for 2001 California Assembly Bill No. 25, 2000·2001 regular 
session (Apr. 18,2001) [hereinafter AB 25 Comm. Report]. 
135 CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000. 
136 In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 141 (2002). 
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years.137 Sharon S. questioned the validity of second-parent 
adoptions.138 Because establishment of a domestic partnership 
was not available when courts first granted same-sex, second-
parent adoptions,139 the Sharon S. decision has placed the legal 
status of those adoptions at risk.14° Jordan Blum, staff 
attorney for the San Diego office of the American Civil 
Liberties Union notes that second-parent adoptions, where the 
partners may have moved out of state and cannot establish 
California residency are in peril.141 He further stated that 
children whose birth parents have died face difficulty if the 
court deems that the second-parent adoptions have no legal 
merit.142 Thus, the child would essentially be an orphan. 143 
Moreover, nullification of these adoptions would place the child 
in financial jeopardy.144 The court can avert the situation 
children will find themselves in by liberally constructing the 
adoption statutes and granting second-parent adoptions.145 
In states that strictly construct adoption statutes, the 
courts defer to the plain language of the statute.146 Even if a 
statute does not promote the justice the court desires, the 
statute requires the court to follow its language. 147 Courts 
137 Bob Egelko, Big Adoption Issue goes to High Court-Same Sex families to be 
affected, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2002, at Al ("vast majority of these adoptions [are) by 
same sex couples). 
138 See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107. 
139 Since the amendment to § 9000 of the California Family Code was enacted on 
January 1, 2002, only those domestic partners who had or have registered as domestic 
partners pursuant to § 297 of the Family Code are statutorily eligible to adopt the 
biological children of their partner. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000. 
140 Lambda Legal, California Supreme Court to Review Second Parent Adoption 
Decision, Lambda Legal Press Release (Jan. 30, 2002) available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi·binliowaldocuments/record?record=987 [hereinafter 
Lambda Legal Jan. 30, 2002). 
141 Lambda Legal, Civil Rights Groups Denounce Court Decision in Second Parent 
Adoptions, Lambda Legal Press Release (Oct. 26, 2001) available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi·binliowaldocuments/record?record=907 [hereinafter 




145 See generally Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116·120 (Kremer, P.J, dissenting). 
146 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374,378 (Neb. 2002). 
147 See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212. ("We agree ... that the absence of 
any legal formalization of her relationship to the children has resulted in a tragic 
situation ... [w)e do not, however agree that the only way to avoid such an unfortunate 
situation is for the courts to adopt appellant's novel theory by which a nonparent can 
acquire the rights of a parent." Id. at 219. 
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must strictly construe the adoption statutes.l48 Yet, courts do 
not always follow this mandate.l49 To act in the best interest of 
the child, courts liberally construe adoption law to conform to 
the courts' sense of justice.150 While some courts do not always 
strictly construe adoption statutes, a California court warned 
against "ingenious" interpretation of the adoption statutes.151 
The court may not create ambiguity in the statute order to 
achieve the result it desires but should interpret adoption 
statutes in such a way to leave no ambiguity for later courts.152 
Further, the court should act in the best interest of the child.153 
To validate the second-parent adoptions granted before 
January 1, 2002, the California Supreme Court must liberally 
construe the adoption statutes. In examining this proposition, 
a look at sister states strengthens the trend to liberally 
construe adoption statutes. States that strictly construe 
adoption statutes and deny adoptions based on the parent's 
sexual orientation ignore evidence that sexual orientation does 
not detriment a child. 154 Whereas, states that liberally 
construe adoption statutes are able to grant adoptions that 
promote the best interest of the child, regardless of the parent's 
sexual orientation.155 
1. Denying Adoption Petitions Based on the Sexual Orientation 
of the Parents Hinders the Promotion of the Best Interest of the 
Child. 
When acting in the best interest of the child, judges should 
base their decision on the home the parents provide for the 
child, not the sexual orientation or marital status of the 
148 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 377. ''The matter of adoption is statutory, and 
the manner of procedure and terms are all specifically prescribed and must be 
followed." Id. 
149 In re Interest of Peter Hart and George Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2001). 
150 Id. at 1185 (In an action involving a same-sex, second-parent adoption, the court 
said, "[I]t is inconceivable to conclude, given the statutory mandate to read the statute 
in the best interest of children, that our Legislature would have meant to exclude 
loving and nurturing two parent homes .... " Jd.) 
151 Adoption of Thevenin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 219, 222 (1961). 
152 Id. 
163 [d. 
154 See Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998). 
155 See Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262 (1993). 
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parents.156 No inherent difference exists between children 
raised in homosexual or heterosexual households.157 It is not 
the sexual orientation of the parent, but the quality of the 
home life, that judges should examine. In the states that do 
not expressly prohibit homosexuals to adopt, many courts have 
not allowed the sexual orientation of the parents to preclude 
such homosexual adoptions.158 In Adoption of EOG, the court 
decided whether an adoption by a homosexual was in the best 
interest of the child.159 From the outset, the Pennsylvania 
court stated that the judges' own personal biases and 
standpoints towards a homosexual lifestyle could not mar the 
court's judgment.16o The EOG court granted the adoption 
based on the extensive evidence that the adoption was in the 
best interest of the child.161 The decision by the court to put 
aside its personal feelings about homosexual parents contrasts 
with the reasoning used by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex 
Parte J.M.F.162 
In Ex Parte J.M.F., a case involving the potential 
termination of the biological mother's parental rights by way of 
stepparent adoption, the court openly disapproved of the 
mother's lifestyle.163 Based on trial court findings, the 
Alabama Supreme Court said that a lesbian mother wrongfully 
portrayed to her children that a homosexual partnership was 
the moral and social equivalent of a heterosexual marriage. 164 
The court refused to support this illegal and immoral 
relationship despite the evidence that the mother may have 
been a good parent.165 The court instead granted custody to the 
father and remanded the case back to the trial court to 
determine the issue of visitation. 166 The court placed the child 
156 Delaney, supra note 68, at 215. 
157 See Child and Family Health Comm., supra note 106, at 339·340; see also Perrin, 
supra note 106, at 341·344. 
158 See Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 
799 (Va. 1993); Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262. 
159 Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 265, 269. 
160 Id. at 265. 
161 Id. at 269. 
162 Compare Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 with Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 
4th 262. 
163 Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1196. 
164 Id. at 1195. 
165 Id. at 1196. 
166 [d. 
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in a household with her biological father and stepmother where 
the two advanced view that a heterosexual marriage is the 
societal and moral norm.167 The court focused on the sexual 
orientation of the parents, rather than the relationship 
between the mother and child. 
Recognizing the need to focus on the best interest of the 
child, instead of the parent's sexual orientation, is pivotal in 
extending current California state law to those adoptions that 
may be adversely affected by the Sharon S. decision. State 
courts, which deny second-parent adoptions, more often 
disapprove of the parent's sexual orientation instead of looking 
at the parental abilities of the homosexual parent.168 Whereas 
state courts which have granted second-parent adoptions, do so 
based on the parental abilities of the parent.169 The courts 
which grant same-sex, second-parent adoptions recognize that 
granting the second-parent adoption promotes the best interest 
of the child, absent express statutory language otherwise 
permitting such adoptions. 
State courts refusing to consider whether the prospective 
adoptive parent acts in the best interest of the child blatantly 
deny the legislative purpose of the adoption statutes. In 
Adoption of Luke,170 the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to 
consider this evidence and produced a result counter to the 
child's best interest. For an adoption petition to be successful 
in Nebraska, the petitioner must fulfill four factors.171 These 
four factors include an inquiry into whether the petitioner is 
eligible to adopt, whether the child is eligible for adoption, 
whether the parties complied with the applicable statues, and 
whether the adoption was in the child's best interest.172 The 
167 [d. at 1195. 
168 See generally id. 
169 See generally cases cited supra note 158. 
170 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374. 
171 [d. at 378. 
172 Id. at 377. The Nebraska legislature does not bar homosexuals from adopting. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43·109. An unmarried person is eligible to adopt. NEB. REV. STAT. § 
43-101. In Adoption of Luke, the parties underwent a home study to determine if the 
child's best interest would be promoted by the adoption. Adoption of Luke, N.W.2d at 
377. The adoption specialist, who conducted the study, recommended the adoption. Id. 
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to liberally construe the adoption 
statutes and grant the second-parent adoption. Id. The Court held that the limited 
relinquishment of parental rights insufficiently followed the requirements of the 
statute. [d. The court briefly mentioned that the adoption specialist recommended the 
adoption and that the adoption has to be in the best interest of the child. [d. 
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court considered all four factors as having equal weight. 
Noncompliance with one factor barred the adoption petition. 
The parties did not comply with the adoption statutes because 
the statute required that the biological parent terminate her 
parental rights so that the nonbiological parent could adopt the 
child.173 Although a home study noted that the adoption would 
be in the child's best interest, the court could not overlook the 
fact that the parties did not comply with the adoption 
statutes.l74 Equating whether the adoption occurs in the best 
interest of the child with the need for strict construction of the 
adoption statute, the court defeated the adoption statutes' 
objective to act in the best interest of the child. Adherence to 
this view by the California Supreme Court will jeopardize the 
thousands of children who enjoy the legal protection from a 
same-sex, second-parent.l75 The child in Adoption of Luke lost 
the benefit of having two legally recognized parents. A 
household with two legally recognized parents provides more 
benefits to a child176 than a household with only one legally 
recognized parent-a result of strict construction of adoption 
statutes. Permitting same-sex second-parent adoptions affords 
the child the benefits to a child to have two, legally sanctioned 
parents. 
Both the Nebraska and Pennsylvania state legislatures, 
like other state legislatures, discourage "absurd" results arising 
from construction of the adoption statutes.l77 In Nebraska, the 
court determined that allowing a second-parent adoption would 
lead to an absurd result while a Pennsylvania court found that 
not granting the second-parent adoption petition would lead to 
an absurd result. 178 Strict construction should not obstruct 
fostering families with two adults who want to raise children. 
Failure to allow second-parent adoptions that occurred before 
January 1, 2002 will produce an equally absurd result. 
173 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 377,383. 
174 Id. at 376. The parents did not have another option in which to adopt the child. 
See generally id. 
175 Lambda Legal Jan. 30, 2002, supra note 140. 
176 See PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NATION, U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CHILD AND FAMILY WELFARE, (1996), at 11. While this report 
discusses heterosexual relationship, it does argue that children brought up in two· 
parent households have a better advantage. See generally id. 
177 Adoption of Luke, 40 N.W.2d at 382; In re Adoption of RB.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 
1202 (Pa. 2002). 
178 Adoption of Luke, 40 N.W.2d at 382; Adoption ofR.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1230. 
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Thousands of children will be left without one of their legal 
parents.179 It would be illogical for the California Supreme 
Court to sever a parent-child relationship because the 
legislature, at the time, had not expressly permitted it. The 
California legislature passed California Assembly Bill 25 to 
recognize the benefit children enjoy by having a legally 
recognized relationship.180 
2. Granting Same-Sex Second-parent Adoptions Based on 
Legislative Intent and Existing Statutory Framework 
Through liberal construction of its adoption statutes, other 
state courts have been able to grant same-sex, second-parent 
adoptions absent explicit language in the statute. The 
approach by state courts, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, and New York recognizes the need to act in the 
child's best interest. As already seen, the New Jersey court 
refused to tacitly support biases held against homosexual 
parents when an adoption would be in the child's best 
interest.181 A Pennsylvania court refused to construe its 
adoption statutes in a way that prevented second-parents from 
adopting. 182 These two courts offer guidance to the decision 
before the California Supreme Court that could possibly nullify 
second-parent adoptions that were granted before January 1, 
2002. Likewise, Delaware and New Jersey courts offer even 
more guidance for the California Supreme Court. A Delaware 
court granted an adoption because the legislature intended 
that an adoption occur in the best interest of the child.183 A 
New York court granted a second-parent adoption by searching 
for a statutory scheme to model. 184 By liberally constructing 
adoption statutes, some sister states grant same-sex second-
parent adoptions, a method the California Supreme Court 
should also employ. 
179 Lambda Legal Oct. 26, 2001, supra note 14l. 
180 A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.) 
181 Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 55l. 
182 Adoption ofR.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202. 
183 Interest of Hart, 808 A.2d at 1183 n.5. 
184 Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1995) 
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a. State Legislatures Intend that Courts Grant Adoption 
Petitions to Promote the Best Interest of the Child. 
The Family Court of Delaware approved a second-parent 
adoption, noting it was in the best interest of the child in In re 
Interest of Peter Hart and George Hart.185 The court found the 
plaintiffs, homosexual partners, to be exemplary parents. The 
codified adoption statute, however, obstructed granting of the 
adoption petition. 186 The Delaware legislature had not 
provided for second-parent adoptions when drafting the 
adoption statutes.187 In granting the adoption, the Court had 
to choose between strictly construing the statute and ignoring 
the overwhelming evidence that the adoption promoted the 
best interest of the child. 188 The court bypassed the 
requirement that courts strictly interpret adoption statutes 
since they were unknown at common law.189 Since the statute 
did not directly address second-parent adoption, the court could 
reach two differing conclusions as to whether to permit the 
adoption. 190 To harmonize the two possible outcomes, the court 
investigated the legislative intent and applied the construction 
that fulfills the purpose to act in the best interest of the 
child.191 The legislature's purpose in the adoption statute is to 
act in the best interest of the child; the common law rule 
requires judges to strictly construe adoption statutes. Thus, 
applying the legislative purpose, rather than the common law 
rule, Delaware courts can grant second-parent adoptions that 
are not expressly allowed for in the statute. 
185 Interest of Hart, 808 A.2d 1179. Gene Hart adopted the two children, biological 
brothers, in the action after first being the children's foster parent. Id. at 1180. Gene 
Hart was in a relationship with Burke Shiri. Id. at 1182. The two men had lived 
together in a committed relationship for twenty· two years. Id. Gene adopted Peter in 
1999 and George in April 2001. Id. In June 2001, Gene's partner, Burke, filed 
petitions in the Delaware Family Court so that he could be become the legal parent 
alongside Gene. Id. at 1182. Numerous reports and affidavits exemplified that 
adoption by Burke was in the best interest of the children. Id. at 1188-1190. Although 
the babies were born addicted to cocaine, through the parenting of Burke and Gene the 
children thrived in their new environment despite the substantial obstacles in their 
way. See id. 
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In California, the legislature's purpose can be found in 
Section 8612 of the California Family Code.192 Section 8612 
allows an adoption to be granted if the court is satisfied that 
the adoption will promote the best interest of the child.193 
Based on California Family Code § 8612, California courts have 
repeatedly acted in the best interest of the child.194 In Sharon 
S., the Department of Health and Human Services twice found 
that granting Annette's adoption petition would be in the best 
interest of the child.195 Even after Sharon received a 
temporary restraining order against Annette, the Department 
of Health and Human Services still recommended the adoption 
because it found that it furthered the children's best interest to 
have Annette as a legally recognized adoptive parent.196 
With thousands of second-parent adoptions at stake in 
California, courts must apply the legislative purpose to act in 
the best interest of the child. Failure to do so may result in 
nullification ofthese adoptions.197 The potential nullification of 
these adoptions runs counter to the legislative purpose.19S 
Dissolving the parental rights of second-parents will leave the 
intended beneficiaries of the adoption statute-the children-
without the emotional, financial and psychological benefits 
they receive through the adoption.199 Such ramifications are 
not in the best interest of the child and would defeat, rather 
than promote, the legislative purpose to act in the best interest 
of the child. 
b. Existing Statutory Framework Allows Second-Parent 
Adoptions To Be Granted 
Another method by which the California Supreme Court 
can reaffIrm the second-parent adoptions granted prior to 
January 1, 2002, is to review whether other instances exist in 
192 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612 (c) (West 1994). 
193 Id. 
194 See generally Henwood's Guardianship, 320 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1958); Adoption of Lenn 
E., 227 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1986); Adoption of McDonald, 274 P.2d 860 (Cal. 1954); Adoption 
of Thevenin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1961). 
195 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *7. 
196 Id. 
197 Lambda Legal Oct. 26, 2001, supra note 14l. 
198 Id. 
199 Delaney, supra note 68, at 177. 
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which an adoption can occur without severing parental rights. 
In Matter of Jacob,20o the New York Court of Appeals first 
noted that it must liberally construe the adoption statutes in 
order to discharge the legislative purpose to act in the best 
interest of the child. 201 The court then realized that following 
the mandate to strictly construe the adoption statute could 
place potential adoptive parents in a "Catch-22."202 Even 
though both the biological and nonbiological parent choose to 
co-parent the child, the courts are prohibited from allowing the 
nonbiological parent to become the child's legal parent without 
severing the right of the child's biological parent.203 To grant 
the second-parent adoption, the court looked to other statutory 
schemes that allow adoption of a child without severing the 
natural parent's parental rights.204 
In New York, stepparent adoptions, underage father 
adoptions, or open adoptions occur without severing the 
parental rights of the natural parents.205 Based on the three 
statutory schemes, the court determined that one person could 
obtain legal, parental rights without severing the natural 
parent's right.206 The court then took its reasoning one step 
further and held that the court could grant a second-parent 
adoption.207 Before the decision in Matter of Jacob, second-
parents faced the possibility that their New York adoption 
petitions would be deemed invalid.208 By liberally constructing 
adoptions, the Jacob court allowed parents who adopted their 
partner's biological child to remain the child's parent. 
In New York, the Jacob Court looked for a legislative 
scheme that allowed adoptions to occur without terminating 
existing parental rights. To determine if a second-parent 
adoption was possible before January 1, 2002, the California 
Supreme Court should also look for an existing statutory 
scheme that allows the biological parent to retain parental 
200 Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 399. 
20} See generally id. 
202 Id at 401. 
203 Id. Upon birth, the child's biological mother is considered the child's legal 
parent. Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 404. Open adoptions occur in agency placements where the birth parent 
will retain post adoption contact with the child. Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 405. 
208 Id. 
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rights in a second-parent adoption. In California, a legislative 
scheme does exist through stepparent adoptions. 209 Using the 
method by New York, California can grant second-parent 
adoptions based on statutory framework already existing that 
recognizes some adoptions occur without terminating the rights 
of the biological parent. 
California courts should follow the example set by the New 
York court. The New York legislature failed to provide for 
second-parent adoptions. The California legislature, until 
2002, similarly failed to provide for second-parent adoptions. 
All California adoptions predating January 1, 2002, face an 
identical dilemma as the parties in Matter of Jacob faced. 210 
Had the New York Court of Appeals denied the same-sex, 
second-parent adoption petition, the legal status of previous 
second-parent adoptions would have been affected.211 The 
Jacob court did not want to deprive the children at issue from 
having two legally recognizable parents.212 The New York 
court did not rewrite the statutes when deciding whether to 
grant the adoption.213 It looked to the intent of the legislature 
and the language of the statute.214 The intent of the legislature 
was to act in the child's best interest.215 The language did not 
expressly forbid homosexual women from adopting a child.216 
Like New York, California does not forbid a homosexual person 
from adopting a child.217 Further, the purpose of the adoption 
statute is to act in the best interest of the child.218 The New 
York court granted the adoption because no express language 
in the statutes prohibited it.219 Since January 1, 2002, 
California expressly allows second-parent adoptions through 
the enactment of California Assembly Bill 25; such previously 
granted adoptions can be achieved and are not counter to the 
language of adoption statutes.220 
209 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8548, 9000 (West 1994). 










220 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000. 
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Further, the California legislature broadened the 
legislative scheme to include adoptions by same-sex, registered 
domestic partners.221 The California legislature defined 
domestic partner as "two adults who have chosen to share one 
another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of 
mutual caring."222 The definition may accurately describe the 
relationship status of same-sex couples when they decided to 
either have a child or have the non-biological parent adopt the 
child.223 Courts grant adoptions in the best interest of the 
child;224 the state legislature requires adoptions to promote the 
interest of the child.225 Liberal construction of section 9000 of 
the Family Code, in light of the mandate to operate in the best 
interest of the child, highlights the intent of the state 
legislature to allow same-sex, registered domestic partners to 
adopt their partners biological children. Society has slowly 
accepted the changing family lifestyle226 and the legislature 
only recently amended the Family Code to reflect this 
change.227 The Delaware and New York courts had less 
statutory direction from the legislature when they granted 
second-parent adoptions than do the California courts. Liberal 
construction of the adoption statute lends itself to an outcome 
that neither creates ambiguity nor misconstrues the statute, 
but rather fits into the legislative scheme and more 
importantly, promotes the best interest of the child. 
221 See id.; see also A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.) "This bill would 
authorize the employment of procedures applicable to stepparent adoption to the 
adoption by a domestic partners, as defined, of the child of his or her domestic partner." 
Id. 
222 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297. 
223 See generally, Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (women had performed a commitment 
ceremony in 1969 and decided to have two children together through artificial 
insemination prior to split in 1985); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990). 
224 See generally case cited, supra note 194. 
225 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612(c). 
226 Delaney, supra note 68, at 206. 
227 A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.) 
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B. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS TO GRANT 
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ABSENT EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION 
FROM THE STATE LEGISLATURE. 
Thousands of second-parent adoptions face potential 
nullification in the state of California.228 When deciding the 
outcome of Sharon S. u. Superior Court, the California 
Supreme Court should decide whether California's superior 
courts had the jurisdiction to grant second-parent adoptions 
before January 1, 2002. 229 If the superior courts did have 
jurisdiction to grant the adoptions, further challenges to these 
thousand adoptions would not face the challenges they 
currently do. If not, further judicial action or legislative decree 
must be set forth to keep these adoptions from being 
overturned in the future. California's superior courts have 
jurisdiction to grant adoptions so long as the child or the 
adoptive parent was domiciled in the state at the time of the 
adoption proceeding.230 Although the state legislature 
statutorily mandates adoptions, they occur by judicial decree.231 
Therefore, superior courts have the authority to grant 
adoptions as they see fit. The California Superior courts had 
the authority to grant the 10,000 to 20,000 adoptions facing 
possible nullification.232 These courts acted in the best interest 
of the child233 because this standard has been established by 
the legislature and is followed by the courtS.234 Judges usually 
construe the statutes liberally in order to effectuate acting in 
the best interest of the child.235 Regardless of the outcome of 
the Sharon S. case, liberal construction of the Independent 
228 Egelko, supra note 137 at AI. 
229 In Sharon S., neither Sharon nor Annette raised the issue of jurisdiction of the 
superior courts to grant second-parent adoptions. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. 
The majority noted that the jurisdiction of the superior courts might not have been 
valid. Id. However, since the neither party argued the issue in their briefs, the court 
chose not to discuss this issue. Id. 
230 10 Witkin Parent & Child § 29 (a) (1) (1990) (citing Rest. 2d, Conflict of Laws § 
78; Estate of Smith, 86 Cal. App. 2d 456, 468, 195 P.2d 842 (1948); see 33 A.L.R.3d 176) 
231 [d. at § 29 (a) (3). 
232 See generally Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. at 116-120 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting); see 
also Egelko, supra note 137 at AI. 
233 See generally cases cited supra note 194. 
234 San Diego Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court of San Diego, 496 P.2d 453, 
463 (Cal. 1972). 
235 [d. at 463. 
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Adoption Act should not hinder the California Supreme Court 
in reaffirming the validity of the thousands of second-parent 
adoptions that the superior courts granted. 
C. APPROACH CALIFORNIA SHOULD TAKE 
The Sharon S. dissent correctly analyzed Marshall, but 
failed to offer remedies for adoptions granted before the 
changes to Section 9000 of the California Family Code. 
Remedies are needed to curtail further challenges to second-
parent adoptions. To prevent the potential reversal of second-
parent adoption petitions granted by trial courts without 
express statutory approval, the legislature should amend, and 
retroactively apply, Section 8617 of the California Family Code. 
Section 8617 of the California Family Code hinders second-
parent adoptions. This section of the Family Code requires 
that the birth parent terminate all parental rights' before the 
adoption of the child.236 Section 8617 currently reads: "The 
birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the 
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all 
responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over the 
child."237 In adoptions granted under the Independent 
Adoption Act,238 birth parents 'have amended the adoption 
statute so that full termination of parental rights does not 
occur.239 Birth parents, like Sharon S. amend the petition so 
the biological parents retain their pareI.'tal rights, much like in 
stepparent adoptions.24o The California state legislature 
should amend Section 8617 of the Family Code to read: 
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the 
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all 
responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over 
the child unless an addendum has been filed in the Superior 
Court, prior to January 1, 2002, retaining the parental rights 
of one of the minor's birth parents. 
236 This does not apply to stepparent adoption where one birth parent retains 
parental rights. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548. 
237 CAL. FAM CODE § 8617. 
238 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8800-8823 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). 
239 See Sharon S., supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7. 
240 See id. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548. 
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This proposed changes explicitly applies to those adoptions 
occurring before the changes to Section 9000 of the Family 
Code implemented on January 1, 2002.241 The legislature 
recognized the importance of fostering same-sex, second-parent 
adoptions when it amended Section 9000 of the Family Code.242 
Retroactive application of a statute is not novel. The California 
Supreme Court noted a family code provision could be 
retroactively applied if it neither denied due process of the law 
nor infringed upon a vested property right.243 While the court 
did not apply the statute retroactively, it did not see lack of 
express direction from the legislature as a bar. 
A statute can be applied retroactively as long as it follows 
legislative intent and does not violate due process of the law.244 
In Marriage of Buol, a California case, the legislature enacted 
statutes amending designation of community and separate 
property while the case was pending on appeal,245 The 
legislature intended that the statute be retroactively applied 
for dissolution proceedings occurring within a given time 
frame. 246 The amended statute applied to the Buol dissolution 
proceedings.247 The court did not retroactively apply the 
statute because retroactive application divested the wife of her 
property right without due process of the law.248 Should the 
California legislature amend California Family Code § 8617, 
retroactive application will not deprive the parties due process 
of the law. Retroactive application will not adversely affect the 
child's life and the continued adoption will provide emotional 
and legal security to the child and assure the child continued 
parental support.249 "The main purpose of adoption statutes is 
the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits 
of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal 
recognition and regulation of the consummation of the closest 
conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and 
241 CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000. 
242 AB 25 Comm. Report, supra note 134. 
243 Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Cal. 1995). 
244 In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 356-357 (Cal. 1985). 
245 Id. at 356. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 357. 
249 Adoption of EGG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 266 (listing factors used by the court 
when deciding whether to grant a second-parent adoption). 
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child."250 Further extension of the California adoption statute 
would fulfill the aforementioned purpose of the adoption 
statutes. 
The dissent of In the Interest of Angel Lace M.,251 offers 
insight into how California's courts can grant a second-parent 
adoption without express statutory language. The dissent 
noted the interest to the public in granting adoption-with the 
decreasing number of children who live traditional in two-
parent homes, a second-parent adoption would allow more 
children to live in two-parent households.252 The Wisconsin 
adoption code contains a statute similar to Section 8617 of the 
California Family Code.253 The Wisconsin code stated, in part: 
After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of 
parent and child between the adopted person and the adoptive 
person's birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of 
the adoptive parent, shall be completely altered and all the 
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the relationship 
shall cease to exist.254 
The dissenting judge looked to ways to interpret the 
statute that would facilitate the best interest of the child in 
light of the fact that the word shall was written into the 
statute.255 While shall implies that the object of the statute is 
mandatory, the dissent interpreted the language . as 
directory.256 The dissent examined four factors before 
determining whether shall is directory or mandatory. The 
dissent analyzed the statute's purpose, the statute's history, 
the alternative outcomes of the adoption and penalties for 
violation of the statute.257 The Wisconsin legislature had 
determined that adoptions should promote the best interest of 
the child.258 When the Angel Lace M. majority did not grant 
the adoption, the dissent surmised that this did not fulfill the 
200 Estate of Santos, 195 P. 1055, 1057 (Cal. 1921). 
251 In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). 
252 Id. at 689 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
253 See id. at 683 n.9 (citing sec. 48.92(2), Stats.) and Cal. Fam. Code § 8617. 
254 See Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 n.9 (citing sec. 48.92(2), Stats.). 
255 Id. at 690, 691. 
256 Id. at 691. 
257 Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 80, 450 
N.W.2d 249 (1990) (quoting State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200. 207, 240 N.W.2d 168 
(1976». 
258 Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
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legislative intent.259 Because the majority did not fulfill the 
legislative intent, the dissent concluded that shall in section 
48.92 should be liberally construed as permissive rather than 
mandatory.260 
The dissent did not rely on its own proposition in 
determining whether to bypass the language in the statute that 
requires a court to sever the biological parent's parental rights. 
261 In following the precedent set by the Vermont Supreme 
Court262 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council,263 
the Angel Lace M. dissent devised a means to grant the 
adoption despite contrary language in the statute.264 The 
Wisconsin legislature mandated liberal construction of the 
adoption statutes yet the majority did not grant· the same-sex, 
second-parent adoption.265 Whereas the Vermont and 
Massachusetts legislatures did not mandate such liberal 
construction and the courts nevertheless granted the same-sex, 
second-parent adoptions.266 Because the adoptions furthered 
the best interest of the children, the Vermont and 
Massachusetts courts chose to bypass the language in the 
statutes requiring the severing of the biological parents' rights 
toward the child.267 
The reasoning applied by the Wisconsin dissent would 
allow an interpretation of the existing California Family Code 
Section 8617 to permit same-sex, second-parent adoptions. The 
reasoning would also allow the California legislature to 
properly amend the statute to permit same-sex, second-parent 
adoptions granted before January 1, 2002. Until such time 
that the California legislature amends the adoption statute, a 
judicial decree by the California Supreme Court permitting 
second-parent adoptions will preserve the legal benefits the 
259 [d. at 693 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
260 [d. at 691 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
261 [d. at 692 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
262 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 
A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1995». 
263 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 
(Mass. 1993». 
264 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
265 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 
266 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315; 
Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271) 
267 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315; 
Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271). 
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child currently enjoys. If the legislature does not amend 
Section 8617, liberal construction of the adoption statutes still 
allows the California courts to grant second-parent adoption 
without express statutory language. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Children may lose legal protections if the California 
Supreme Court deems void the second-parent adoptions 
granted before January 1, 2002. Finding these adoptions void 
will harm the children at issue. In interpreting and applying 
adoption statues, courts must look to the legislative intent and 
the statutory language. If the adoption statute does not 
expressly forbid the adoption sought and the adoption would 
fulfill the legislative intent, the court should grant the 
adoption. If courts strictly construe adoption statutes, they 
deny children important benefits. Children would not be best 
served by severing the legal relationship with one of their 
parents. Children are best served by enjoying legal 
relationships with both the biological and nonbiological 
parents. 
The California Supreme Court should liberally construe 
the adoption statutes in similar fashion to courts in 
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, so that 
thousands of children could retain the legal protections offered 
by their second-parent. Currently, California expressly allows 
same-sex, second-parents to adopt, but the statute does not 
benefit those adoptions granted before January 1, 2002. 
Liberally constructing the California adoption statutes would 
not run against express statutory language and would promote 
the best interest of the child-the primary concern of the 
adoption statues. 
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